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Abstract-The Dutch auction (the price progressively of the offered object, and (iii) transaction "transfalls until a buyer "takes" the object) is proposed as parency" (fraud prevention) [1] . For medium-access cona foundation for decentralised medium-access control. trol (MAC), auctions provide a form of "prioritised Common auction formats are well-understood, relatively access" in that the channel is allocated to the termisimple mechanism which have long been used for allo-nal that most values access. A terminal's valuation of cating an indivisible good to the party that values it the nalethatomostevalues(access.eAeterminal'suvaluationro os,for such reasons as speed of allocation, discovery access could either (a) represent the "true" monetary most, "o uhraosa pe falcto,dsoey4;willingness to pay" of a (selfish) human user, or (b) of the true "value" of the object, and fraud prevention. Various auction schemes have been proposed for be a "priority" index computed/adjusted by software the allocation of telecommunication resources, including inside the terminal using local information (e.g., [2], medium access control (MAC). But previously proposals [6]). A terminal's priority may vary on such factors as require a controller, and, to receive the bids, an alternate its "importance", packet type, location, channel state, protocol which could waste resources, or miss important distance travelled, battery status, etc. bids. For MAC, the Dutch auction has several major virtues: (i) a bid-processing protocol that automatically and simply prioritises the highest bid(s); (ii) possibility of Sealed-bid auctions for MAC distributive (auctioneer-free) implementation for synchronised terminals; (iii) confirmation of transmitter-receiver pairs at auction time, with smooth continuation if the A MAC auction should be relatively simple and pair is infeasible; (iv) exceptional signalling economy (the rapidly produce a winner, since access must be granted only strictly necessary signal is the winning bid). Secure quickly, and repetitively. Thus [2] , [6], [8] propose the software inside each terminal may record transactions for equivalent of a "sealed bid" auction; i.e., each bid is eventual payment collection, or the auction can be used as a independently submitted in a "sealed envelope", the prioritised-access algorithm, without real money exchange. auctioneer "opens" all bids simultaneously, the highest Below we evaluate qualitatively the MAC potential of bidder wins, and pays as pre-specified by the rules. be wasteful of resources; and if it is contention-based, General reasons for choosing auctions include (i) the highest-value terminals may be unable to make a bid, speed of allocation, (ii) discovery of the true "value" and, consequently, a suboptimal allocation may result. In a Dutch auction, a public "clock" displays a pro-is not successful, the auction continues. Evidently, for gressively falling price. Each participant watches and each price value, the "tick" of the auction "clock" must waits until the price reaches a desired level. At some allow sufficient time for the possible exchange of these point, the participant that most values the object indicates 3 messages before moving on to the next lower price. its willingness to pay the current price [1] .
The example below explains the process further. For MAC purposes, the Dutch auction retains the Specific example: Figure 1 shows a situation in which relative simplicity and allocation speed of sealed-bid 7 terminals wish access to a single communication chanauctions, and add several fundamental advantages: (i) A nel. A row in table I shows the index of a transmitter, its built-in bid-processing protocol that automatically and desired receiver, and valuation. Conceivably, a terminal simply prioritise the highest bid(s); (ii) the possibility could have a buffer with several possible messages each of a distributive (auctioneer-free) implementation (start with its own valuation (see rows 2 and 3). times, initial price, and rate of decrease can all be prespecified, so that a terminal can determine from its own clock the current status of the auction); (iii) Confirmation of transmitter-receiver pairs at auction time, with smooth i A continuation if the pair is infeasible; (iv) exceptional signalling economy (only one bid signal (the winner's) T3 r1 T2 r2r3Tl T4r T5 r5 T7 r6 T6 r7
is strictly necessary in a single channel scenario).
Evidently, the distributed implementation requires Figure 1 . The distributed Dutch auction as a MAC protocol with tight synchronisation among terminals, i.e., a "common spatial reuse clock" (as would any "time slotted" or "spread spectrum" MAC scheme). However, unsynchronised terminals can be accommodated with the presence of an auctioneer, Table I which can announce the beginning of the auction and POTENTIAL TRANSMITTERS, Core protocol: For synchronised terminals, the distributed Dutch auction can provide medium access, with At to, each terminal (regardless of the physical locaspatial reuse. At tothe first auction starts with the pre-tion) knows that the (distributed) Dutch auction starts, specified initial price, and time-rate of decrease, and lasts at a pre-specified price, say 11, which will fall at a rate t. At time to + t the first winner(s) access the medium of 0.1 every e. E < t is long enough to allow the 3 for a length of time T (even if a winner is selected messages mentioned above. After a length of time of in less than t, channel access starts at to +t). At time 9F the price is 10.1, which is too high for everyone. to + t + T another auction of length t starts, with pre-After one more F, the price becomes 10. Terminal 1 specified parameters, followed by a period of channel immediately sends its "I take it" message but r1 is out of usage of length T, and so on.
range, and does not respond. Thus, the clock continues When a terminal wishes to "take it", up to 3 short to"tick" without a winner. 10F later, the price drops to messages may be sent: (1) the winner sends its ID and 9, and T1 sends another "I take it" message this time that of the desired receiver (2) the receiver, if available, with intended partner r4. r4 is in range, but in sleeping sends a short confirmation message (3) the winner sends mode (indicated by a dotted red outline in fig. 1 ). Again, a 2nd short message confirming the successful pairing, the pairing fails, and the clocks continues to tick (T1 These 3 messages are reminiscent of the RTSICTS has no additional potential partners, and "drops out" of this auction). Eventually the price reaches 7, which Conclusion triggers an "I take it" from T2 (heard by T1, rl, r2 Previous work has shown the feasibility and effecand r3); r2 confirms (heard by Tl, T2, T4 and r3), and tiveness of auctions for simple, adaptively-prioritised T2 confirms the successful pairing (heard by T1, rl, medium-access allocation. But previous proposals rer2 and r3). Notice that T3 has not heard any of the quire an auctioneer (controller), and an alternate MAC previous messages, and continues to behave as if there protocol to handle bids, which could either waste rehas been no winners. Thus, 10_ later, T3 'thinks' that sources, or miss important bids. We have analysed the price is 6, and sends its "I take it" (heard only by qualitatively the potential of the Dutch auction for rl). But r1declines, because it knows about the T2 -* r2 medium access allocation, and conclude that it retains pairing (notice that r1 would not have known this without the favourable features of previously proposals, while the second message from T2). The process continues remedying their most serious limitations, and expanding similarly with T5 and T6 setting successful pairings, but the set of scenarios where MAC auctions can be used. not T7. Notice that, similar to T3 before, T7 has not heard any of the preceding messages, and 'thinks' it has REFERENCES won when its clock indicates that the price is 2, but [1] E. Wolfstetter, "Auctions: An introduction," Journal of Ecor6 declines because it knows of the successful T6 -r7
nomic Surveys, vol. 10, pp. 367-420, Dec 1996. pairing ( valuation. Thus, the terminals whose "true" valuations were equal to 2, would have new valuations in the range 1,5 to 2,5. The probability that two terminals remain tied after the randomisation is negligible.
